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ABSTRACT
Big 4 auditors perform most audits of companies that issue initial public offerings (IPOs).
Regulators have expressed interest in increasing IPO audit market competition and a growing
body of evidence suggests that Second-Tier auditors could provide IPO audit service quality
comparable to that of Big 4 auditors. However, there exists limited empirical evidence on
whether IPO audit service quality varies with auditor type. I investigate whether IPO audit
service quality differs between Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors for a sample of small and midsized IPOs from 2005 through 2019. I find that Big 4 clients are associated with lower pre-IPO
discretionary accruals, suggesting that Big 4 auditors are better able to constrain the
opportunistic financial reporting decisions of management. I also examine whether the extent of
accounting comments in Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) comment letters on the
registration statement varies by auditor type. I find that Big 4 clients receive fewer initial
accounting comments and that they more effectively address these comments, suggesting that
Big 4 auditors are better able to advise clients on achieving compliance with SEC reporting
standards. Collectively, my findings suggest that Big 4 auditors provide higher IPO audit service
quality than Second-Tier auditors. However, I find that Big 4 clients are not less likely to be sued
in IPO-related litigation and that they pay a considerable audit fee premium relative to SecondTier clients. These findings should be of interest to those who influence IPO auditor selection
and must consider the viability of Second-Tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4. In addition,
my findings should be informative to regulators concerned that the lack of audit market
competition may not provide sufficient incentives for Big 4 auditors to deliver high quality
audits.
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SECTION I. INTRODUCTION
Regulators are interested in promoting competition for initial public offering (IPO) audits
because it could increase audit quality and reduce audit costs. For example, in a 2008 report, the
Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP) concluded that non-Big 4 auditors
were being unfairly restricted from engaging IPO clients by third parties (e.g., underwriters,
lenders, credit rating agencies), recommending that the SEC require companies to disclose in
their registration statements any agreements that limit auditor choice (e.g., underwriting
agreements) (ACAP 2008). In addition, in 2020, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
adopted amendments to independence requirements for IPO auditors, contending that such
changes should “expand the pool of eligible auditors for domestic first-time filers… reduce audit
fees… and positively influence audit quality” (SEC 2020). These efforts indicate that non-Big 4
auditors could be a viable alternative to Big 4 auditors in IPOs. However, empirical evidence on
whether IPO audit service quality varies with auditor type is limited. In this study, I examine
whether Big 4 auditors provide higher quality IPO audit services than Second-Tier auditors.1
I focus my investigation on small and mid-sized IPOs, or companies with less than $1
billion in pre-IPO year revenues (GAO 2003; SEC 2018). Second-Tier auditors compete with
Big 4 auditors for small and mid-sized IPOs, but not for large IPOs.2 Second-Tier auditors claim
that their services are desirable because they possess the necessary resources, skills, and
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Second-Tier auditors include non-Big 4 auditors that are annually inspected by the Public Company Accounting
Oversight Board (PCAOB) because they perform more than 100 audits of public companies each year (GAO 2008;
DeFond et al. 2017; Moon et al. 2019). The Second-Tier auditors with IPOs in my study include BDO, Grant
Thornton, Marcum (since 2014), and RSM (McGladrey before 2015). I use PCAOB inspection reports to determine
whether a non-Big 4 auditor is annually inspected in the year when their client went public. Information on PCAOB
inspection reports is available at: https://pcaobus.org/oversight/inspections/firm-inspection-reports.
2
During my sample, the Big 4 audit over 80% of small and mid-sized IPOs but nearly 100% of large IPOs. A 2003
report by the Government Accountability Office characterizes the public company audit market as having a dual
market structure where Big 4 auditors compete with non-Big 4 auditors for small and mid-sized company audits, but
only the Big 4 compete for large public company audits (GAO 2003).

1

experience for high audit quality, because they are subject to annual Public Company
Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) inspections, and because their staffing structure allows
for more partner and manager interaction with the client at a lower cost than Big 4 competitors
(BDO 2007; GT 2016; Daoust et al. 2021). Because IPO client size is correlated with factors that
influence auditor-client alignment and IPO audit quality (e.g., offering size, complexity,
geographic reach, etc.), excluding large IPOs allows me to construct a sample of relatively
similar clients that are auditable by both auditor types (i.e., Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors).3
Small and mid-sized IPOs reflect an economically meaningful segment of the IPO
market.4 Companies making their first public equity offer face significant information
asymmetries and investors rely on financial information in the registration statement to develop
expectations of company value (Brau and Fawcett 2006). Auditors enhance the credibility of this
information through independent assurance over the financial statements and by issuing a
comfort letter which aids the underwriter in their due diligence over information in the
registration statement derived from the company’s accounting records (STB 2016; GT 2018;
PwC 2021). Therefore, given the importance of financial information in investor decisions and
the equity capital raised by small and mid-sized IPO companies, it is important to understand
whether IPO audit quality is associated with auditor type.

3

I do not examine whether IPO audit service quality varies between Big 4 and smaller non-Big 4 auditors (i.e.,
triennially inspected auditors) because prior research suggests that smaller non-Big 4 auditors provide lower IPO
audit quality relative to both Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors (Weber and Willenborg 2003; Albring et al. 2007). In
addition, prior research documents that the client characteristics of smaller non-Big 4 and Big 4 auditors have little
overlap (Khurana et al. 2021). Similarly, I find little overlap between the characteristics of Big 4 or Second-Tier IPO
clients and smaller non-Big 4 IPO clients (untabulated).
4
Total IPO proceeds for the small and mid-sized companies in my sample (N = 788) are $107.5 billion with average
offering size of $136.4 million. Using similar sample restrictions, total IPO proceeds for large companies (N = 88;
not included in my sample) are $65.8 billion, with average offering size of $748.8 million. IPO proceeds are
calculated as the total number of shares issued in the IPO multiplied by the IPO offer price. IPO proceeds indicate an
amount of potential investor loss and, relatedly, reflect the upper limit on damages from IPO-related lawsuits
(Venkataraman et al. 2008).

2

There are at least two other important reasons to investigate this question. First, while the
audit committee is charged with overseeing the selection and appointment of the auditor for
public companies, management is typically responsible for auditor selection in private companies
preparing to IPO (Esplin et al. 2018). An IPO represents the first time that a company’s auditor is
revealed to the public, elevating the importance of auditor selection, but many managers have not
been previously involved in selecting an IPO auditor. Moreover, evidence suggests that
underwriters and other parties involved in the IPO can influence the selection process (ACAP
2008). They may perceive the Big 4 brand as being associated with higher IPO audit service
quality (Reilly 2006; GAO 2003; GAO 2008; Gray and Ratzinger 2010; Daoust et al. 2021), but
empirical evidence on actual differences in such quality is limited. Second, auditors have strong
incentives to win IPO company audits because they offer high margins, the promise of a
continued relationship with the IPO company as it grows, and visibility to the IPO client that
could improve the associated auditor’s image (Stuart 2008). If IPO audit service quality does not
differ across auditor type, the perception that Big 4 auditors provide higher quality IPO audit
services could be reinforcing a status quo that is limiting the extent of competition in the market
for audits of small and mid-sized IPOs.
Theory suggests that, due to their size, Big 4 auditors could be associated with higher
IPO audit service quality because of the auditors’ higher competence, larger resources, and
greater reputational and litigation incentives (DeAngelo 1981; Dopuch and Simunic 1982;
Palmrose 1988). However, recent evidence suggests that audit quality between Big 4 and
Second-Tier auditors is comparable among already-public companies following the regulatory
and audit market changes of the early 2000s – such as the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002 (SOX) (SOX 2002), the PCAOB’s program of annual audit firm quality inspections, the
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demise of Arthur Andersen, and the rapid subsequent growth of Second-Tier auditors (Boone et
al. 2010; DeFond et al. 2017). Daoust et al. (2021) interview audit partners to learn about
organizational climates of non-Big 4 accounting firms and a non-Big 4 partner with Big 4
experience casts doubt on the notion of quality differences in the post-SOX era stating “(the
difference in quality) is just perception… Some people want to believe that they get what they
pay for. Because they pay more to the Big 4, they would like to believe they get a higher quality
product.”
Several characteristics of the IPO audit setting further suggest that it is unclear whether
IPO audit service quality varies across auditor type. First, IPO auditors should have strong
litigation incentives because they are subject to significant litigation exposure under the
Securities Act of 1933 (Venkataraman et al. 2008).5 Second, many parties are involved in the
IPO process and in the preparation and review of the registration statement (e.g., underwriters,
accounting advisors, legal counsel, consultants). These parties should provide a “floor” to the
quality of an IPO company’s financial reporting and disclosure through their monitoring and
advising activities, reducing the opportunity for external auditors to require adjustments related
to transactions, account balances, and disclosures (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Third, the IPO
audit requires a deep understanding of PCAOB standards and SEC registration statement
requirements. The Big 4 have historically audited more IPOs, but Second-Tier firms have robust
IPO advisory practices and are annually inspected by the PCAOB, suggesting they may have the
requisite knowledge for high IPO audit service quality.

5

IPO auditors are subject to Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933, which provides investors the right to sue
issuers, their directors and officers, underwriters, and accountants for declines in security value below the offer price
due to omissions of material facts in the prospectus (Hanley and Hoberg 2012). Section 11 does not require the
plaintiff to establish that the defendant had an intent to injure or knowledge of the misrepresentation, but this is
required for claims against already-public companies under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 (DLA Piper
2017).

4

I examine whether two dimensions of IPO audit service quality vary with auditor type.
First, I examine discretionary accruals in the pre-IPO year because they reflect the quality of the
financial reporting decisions made by management and allowed by the auditor (Venkataraman et
al. 2008; Ball and Shivakumar 2008). Second, I investigate the number of initial, as well as
subsequent, accounting comments in SEC comment letters on the registration statement.
Auditors advise clients on achieving compliance with SEC standards; therefore, the presence of
more accounting comments suggests a higher number of accounting treatment and disclosure
concerns by the SEC, reflecting lower IPO audit service quality.
I construct a sample of small and mid-sized IPOs on major U.S. exchanges from 2005
through 2019. I find that important characteristics of the offering that should influence the
demand for audit quality, including offering size and the percent of the company sold in the
offering (Leland and Pyle 1977; Willenborg 1999), are similar across auditor type. IPO clients
also have similar assets, revenues, and revenue growth across auditor type. However, IPO
companies with Big 4 auditors are younger, less leveraged, have higher litigation risk, are more
complex, have more foreign operations, and are more likely to use a prestigious underwriter and
receive venture capital investment. Still, there is considerable overlap in these characteristics
across auditor type. In my regressions, I control for these and other factors that could influence
IPO audit service quality and the use of a Big 4 auditor.
I find that Big 4 IPO clients are associated with lower absolute and signed discretionary
accruals, suggesting that Big 4 auditors are more conservative in their audit procedures. I also
find that Big 4 IPO clients receive fewer initial SEC accounting comments, suggesting that Big 4
auditors better advise clients on their draft registration statements. Initial accounting comments
are positively associated with accounting comments in subsequent rounds, but this association is
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weaker for Big 4 IPO clients, suggesting that Big 4 auditors help clients address issues initially
identified by the SEC more effectively. My inferences remain unchanged when I use entropybalancing to achieve covariate balance between Big 4 and Second-Tier IPOs.6
I also examine the types of accounting issues identified in initial SEC comment letters.
Using the accounting issue framework described in Cassell et al. (2013b), I find that Big 4 clients
have fewer issues related to Non-Core Earnings (i.e., one-time items and non-operating
activities), but not related to other issue categories including Core Earnings (i.e., operating
activities), Classification, and Fair Value. This finding supports the notion that Big 4 auditors
have deep knowledge on a broad range of accounting issues that allows them to differentiate the
quality of their IPO audit services from that of Second-Tier auditors.
Prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors may be preferred in IPOs because they could
reduce the risk of litigation against the IPO company or underwriter and because their “deep
pockets” allow for greater recovery in the event of litigation (i.e., an insurance role) (Menon and
Williams 1991; Willenborg 1999). Higher quality auditors should be better able to reduce
material omissions or untruths in the registration statement, a necessary condition for IPO-related
litigation. However, I find no significant association between the filing of IPO-related litigation
and auditor type, even after controlling for ex-ante litigation risk. In addition, most cases are
settled and the average settlement amount is modest, at roughly 5 percent of IPO proceeds,
suggesting that Second-Tier auditors should be able to provide sufficient coverage in the case of

6

Entropy balancing ensures covariate balance on observables across auditor type by assigning weights to
observations such that those more likely to have received treatment (i.e., to have engaged a Big 4 auditor) are
assigned greater weights (Hainmueller 2012). I cannot rule out the possibility that unobservable client characteristics
associated with auditor-client alignment and audit quality are contributing to my results, an issue common to
research on auditor type and auditor quality. I discuss how I have addressed this possibility in Section 5.

6

litigation. Therefore, it does not appear that Big 4 auditors should be preferred because they can
more effectively play an insurance role for small and mid-sized IPOs.
Collectively, my results suggest that Big 4 auditors provide higher IPO audit service
quality than Second-Tier auditors. Prior research suggests that, in addition to their insurance role,
Big 4 auditors could be preferred in IPOs because they play a more effective information
signaling role (Menon and Williams 1991). Specifically, they are perceived to better enhance the
credibility of financial information, allowing companies to better signal their value and reducing
the costs faced by underwriters and investors when gathering information about the company.
My audit quality findings are consistent with the information signaling role to the extent that
such perceived differences could be grounded in the higher actual quality of Big 4 IPO audit
services. However, I leave this investigation to future research.
The decision to use a Big 4, rather than a Second-Tier auditor, is also influenced by cost
considerations (Hogan 1997). I examine differences in audit fees between Big 4 and Second-Tier
IPO auditors. I find that in the pre-IPO (IPO year), after controlling for other factors that
determine audit fees, Big 4 clients pay 45.2 (65.9) percent higher fees than Second-Tier clients,
equivalent to approximately $0.34 million ($0.80 million) higher audit fees for a representative
IPO in my sample.
Regulators interested in promoting IPO audit market competition can do so by bringing
attention to the potential costs and benefits of using Second-Tier auditors as an alternative to the
Big 4. The relatively higher audit quality of Big 4 auditors suggests that they have sufficient
incentives for higher audit quality than their competitors, despite their dominant position in the
market. However, I reiterate calls for disclosure in the registration statement of agreements with
third parties that restrict IPO auditor choice (O’Malley 2008: GT 2008; ACAP 2008). Such
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parties are unlikely to be sensitive to the implications of IPO auditor choice (e.g., higher fees)
given the transitory nature of their involvement with the IPO company.
My study contributes to the limited literature on IPO audit quality (e.g., Weber and
Willenborg 2003) by documenting that Big 4 auditors provide higher IPO audit service quality
than Second-Tier auditors. I also contribute to the literature on earnings management around
IPOs by documenting that Big 4 auditors are more conservative in their audit of the pre-IPO
financial statements (e.g., Teoh et al. 1998; Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Venkataraman et al.
2008). I contribute to research on the determinants of SEC registration statement comment letters
in IPOs (e.g., Li and Liu 2017; Lowry et al. 2020). I also contribute to the extensive body of
research that examines the relation between auditor type and audit quality among already-public
companies (Lennox and Pittman 2010; Boone et al. 2010; Lawrence et al. 2011; Bills et al. 2016;
DeFond et al. 2017; Jiang et al. 2019).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II provides background and
develops my empirical predictions. In Sections III and IV, I describe my research design and
sample. Section V presents the empirical results, along with the results from additional analyses.
Section VI offers concluding remarks.
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SECTION II. BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
Prior Research on Auditors and IPOs
Going public allows a company to raise equity capital, boost its profile, and create a
market for its shares, which permits founders and other shareholders to convert some of their
wealth into cash (Ritter and Welch 2002). Going public is a time-consuming and costly process.
Companies are encouraged to allow two to three years to prepare for being a public company
(RSM 2021). Preparation involves changes to financial reporting processes, internal control,
corporate structure, and governance intended to ensure accurate and timely reporting and
compliance with public company rules set by the SEC and U.S. stock exchanges (STB 2016).
Preparation also involves choosing the company’s IPO working group, which typically consists
of management, external auditors, accounting advisors, underwriters, lawyers, and owners of the
company.
Companies making their first public equity offer are subject to significant information
asymmetries between issuers and investors (Chaplinsky et al. 2017). Managers, who often also
share in company ownership, have incentives to manipulate this information to increase IPO
proceeds and the value of their equity holdings (Friedlan 1994; DuCharme et al. 2001). The SEC
requires that the Form S-1 registration statement be the primary source of information during the
IPO process to protect investors and maintain efficient capital markets (Bushee et al. 2020).
IPO auditors play a critical role in this process. They provide assurance on the financial
statements in the registration statement, advise clients on achieving initial compliance with SEC
reporting requirements, and facilitate the SEC registration statement review process by aiding
clients with their responses to SEC comment letters issued as part of the SEC’s required review
of every registration statement (STB 2016). IPO auditors also aid the underwriter in their

9

financial due diligence by issuing a comfort letter over information in the registration statement
derived from the company’s accounting records. A comfort letter assures that information in the
registration statement is correctly prepared and that no material changes have occurred since its
preparation.7
Prior research suggests that IPO audit service quality is desirable for at least two reasons.
First, it should improve the credibility of the company’s financial information through greater
assurance that it faithfully reflects the underlying economics of the company. This allows
companies to better signal their value and reduces the costs faced by underwriters and investors
gathering information about the company (i.e., an information signaling role) (Menon and
Williams 1991). Second, it should reduce the risk of litigation resulting from low-quality
financial reporting and omissions or untruths in the registration statement and deep pocketed
auditors should allow for greater recovery in the event of litigation (i.e., an insurance role)
(Beatty 1989; Willenborg 1999).
Menon and Williams (1991) find that most companies changing auditors before an IPO
switch to a Big 4 auditor, indicating that they are perceived to provide higher quality IPO audit
services, although only about 4 percent of all IPO companies make such a change.8 Simunic and
Stein (1987) find that companies engaging a Big 4 auditor obtain a higher market premium over
book value subsequent to the issue. Beatty (1989) finds that clients using a Big 4 auditor are
associated with lower IPO underpricing, a measure of the wealth transferred from existing
owners to new investors, suggesting less uncertainty about the value of the IPO.

7

The auditor typically provides one comfort letter at the time the underwriting agreement is signed and another at
the IPO closing date (an updated or “bring down letter”) (STB 2016).
8
For ease of exposition, I use the term “Big 4” here and throughout the paper when discussing research examining
the largest auditing firms. The largest auditing firms were previously the Big 8, the Big 6, or the Big 5.
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Although prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors are perceived to provide higher IPO
audit service quality, the research on actual differences in IPO audit service quality between Big
4 and Second-Tier auditors is limited. To my knowledge, Weber and Willenborg (2003) is the
only such study. Using a sample of microcap IPOs on U.S. exchanges (those that raise less than
$10 million) from 1993 through 1994, the authors find no difference between Big 4 and SecondTier auditors in the extent to which going-concern opinions provide information about future
delistings and stock returns. However, it is unclear whether these inferences generalize to small
and mid-sized IPOs.9
IPO Audit Service Quality
The primary role of the IPO auditor is to issue an opinion on the financial statements
included in the registration statement. The auditor applies PCAOB auditing procedures to ensure
that the financial information reported is consistent with GAAP and fairly reflects the underlying
economics of the company. Prior research examines earnings quality around IPOs and suggests
that the monitoring of auditors should influence the pre-IPO financial reporting decisions of
management (Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Venkataraman et al. 2008).10
In addition, IPO auditors advise clients on achieving compliance with SEC reporting
standards. The auditor provides feedback to the company on the draft registration statement
before it is initially submitted to the SEC, including technical accounting advice, guidance on
drafting the financial statements and other disclosures in the prospectus, and review of the
registration statement to ensure the accuracy, completeness, and consistency of included

9

The average company in my sample has IPO proceeds of $136 million.
Early research documents that managers of IPO companies inflate pre-IPO earnings to maximize the IPO process
(Teoh et al. 1998). However, Ball and Shivakumar (2008) find that this is not the case, suggesting that managers of
IPO companies are limited in their ability to manage earnings in the pre-IPO period because of the high litigation
and regulatory risk from inflating earnings, and higher-than-usual scrutiny by market monitors such as analysts,
underwriters, auditors, boards, the press, and other parties to the transaction.
10

11

financial information and disclosures (STB 2016).11 Upon completing its initial review, the SEC
provides the company with comments on items that should be clarified or revised. Management
and company counsel usually draft the company’s response to each comment, along with an
amended registration statement. The auditors review the responses and provide feedback,
particularly for matters related to the financial statements and associated financial information
(GT 2018). The company then files a written response and amended registration statement to the
SEC and the review process repeats until the SEC is satisfied. Once the registration statement is
deemed effective, the company is allowed to issue its equities on public stock exchanges.
Companies have incentives to minimize the extent of SEC comments during this process
because they are a distraction from normal operations and because the information in the
registration statement can “go stale,” requiring the inclusion of additional quarterly or annual
financial statements in the registration statement. Li and Liu (2017) find that IPO companies
with more SEC comment letters experience greater downward price revisions in the IPO offer
price from the initial registration statement filing date to the IPO issue date (i.e., the registration
period). Lowry et al. (2020) find that comments related to revenue recognition in the first SEC
comment letter are associated with greater downward price revisions and that more SEC
comment letters are associated with a greater reduction in the number of shares the company
intends to issue during the registration period. Higher quality IPO audit services should help
companies minimize the extent of initial comments raised by the SEC and reduce the extent to
which initial comments persist in the form of subsequent accounting comments.

11

External auditors must be independent and cannot be directly involved in the preparation of the financial
statements and other parts of the registration statement. Prior to the SOX prohibition of certain non-audit services
(ReedSmith 2003), external auditors were allowed to provide a wider range of services for IPO clients.
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IPO Audit Service Quality and the Use of a Big 4 Auditor
The question of whether Big 4 auditors provide higher audit quality has been extensively
researched among already-public companies. Theory suggests that Big 4 auditors should provide
higher audit quality because they have greater reputational concerns and more independence than
non-Big 4 auditors (DeAngelo 1981). Big 4 auditors also have greater litigation concerns, with
more to lose owing to their deep pockets and the capital invested in building their brand
(Palmrose 1988). In addition, Big 4 auditors are expected to be more competent because their
larger size allows them to attract and retain higher quality human capital (Dopuch and Simunic
1982). Prior research among already-public companies generally finds that Big 4 auditors
provide higher audit quality than non-Big 4 auditors (Becker et al. 1998; Lennox and Pittman
2011; DeFond et al. 2017).
However, a growing body of research argues that Second-Tier auditors, which are
commonly defined as non-Big 4 auditors that are annually (rather than triennially) inspected by
the PCAOB, could provide audit quality comparable to that of Big 4 auditors (Boone et al. 2010;
Cassell et al. 2013a; DeFond et al. 2017). The impetus for this comparison is the rapid postAndersen growth of Second-Tier auditors and reforms mandated by SOX, such as the
implementation of the PCAOB’s inspection process. These changes are argued to have reduced
the scale advantages and differential incentives for audit quality of Big 4 audit firms over
Second-Tier audit firms. In addition, SOX-related changes are argued to have increased client
incentives for accurate financial reporting (Nelson 2006). Consistent with such arguments,
empirical evidence on already-public companies suggests that Second-Tier auditors provide audit
quality comparable to that of Big 4 auditors. For example, Boone et al. (2010) and DeFond et al.
(2017) find that abnormal accruals do not differ across auditor type (i.e., Big 4 vs. Second-Tier).
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Cassell et al. (2013a) find that the perceived financial reporting credibility of audit clients does
not vary across auditor type. Because the primary role of the IPO auditor is to provide an opinion
on the financial statements included in the registration statement, the arguments for comparable
audit quality between Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors are applicable in the context of IPO audits.
On the one hand, IPO companies with Big 4 auditors could be associated with higher IPO
audit service quality because they could have more knowledge on a broad range of accounting
issues given the depth of their experience in already-public and IPO company audits. Big 4
auditors have large international networks, large advisory practices, large SEC National Tax
Office groups, and have on staff many former policy writers or board members (Daoust et al.
2021). This knowledge could allow them to better identify necessary audit adjustments or to
better anticipate and respond to SEC accounting comments. Big 4 auditors also charge
significant IPO audit fee premiums that could allow them to allocate more resources to IPO
audits than Second-Tier auditors.
On the other hand, Second-Tier auditors have grown significantly, potentially reducing
the scale advantage of Big 4 auditors in the IPO setting. The passage of SOX creates similar
regulatory firm-level pressures across auditor type (i.e., annual PCAOB inspections), suggesting
uniformity in firm-level audit quality control systems that could indicate no difference in IPO
audit service quality across auditor type.12 A significant number of non-Big 4 auditors are alumni
of the Big 4 or their predecessor firms (Gray and Ratzinger 2010). In addition, evidence suggests
that non-Big 4 auditors use a less leveraged audit staffing model where more senior employees
are assigned to engagements and where audit partners provide more personalized attention to
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In addition, managers are expected to deliver Section 302 and 404(a) certifications in the first 10-Q and 10-K
shortly after the IPO, respectively, and auditors must provide a 404(b) attestation in the second 10-K after the IPO
(unless the company is an emerging-growth company and elects to opt out of this requirement), so the quality of
financial reporting systems is likely improved by the anticipatory effect of these provisions (Nelson 2006).
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their clients than Big 4 auditors, specifically for small and mid-sized companies (Daoust et al.
2021). Second-Tier accounting firms also have robust IPO advisory practices and frequently
serve as accounting advisors (rather than as external auditors) for IPO transactions so SecondTier auditors could have the requisite knowledge for high IPO audit service quality.
The IPO setting offers litigation and reputational concerns that suggest that Big 4 and
Second-Tier auditors are both incentivized to provide high quality services. IPO auditors should
have strong litigation incentives because they are subject to Section of the Securities Act of
1933. They should have strong reputational incentives because IPO audits offer high margins,
the promise of a continued relationship with the IPO company as it grows, and visibility to the
IPO client that could improve the associated auditor’s image (Stuart 2008).
Finally, in addition to external auditors, companies preparing to go public engage with
multiple other parties (e.g., underwriters, accounting advisors, legal counsel, consultants, etc.).
These parties should provide a “floor” to the quality of an IPO company’s financial reporting and
disclosure through their monitoring and advising activities.13 Higher quality financial reporting
could reduce the opportunity for external auditors to suggest adjustments related to transactions,
account balances, and disclosures (DeFond and Zhang 2014). Therefore, there could be limited
variation in IPO audit service quality across auditor type.
Given these opposing arguments, I do not predict a direction between
IPO audit service quality and IPO auditor type and state the hypothesis in the null form:
H1: IPO audit service quality is not higher for Big 4 auditors.
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For example, accounting advisors can directly assist clients in preparing all parts of the registration statement,
including the financial statements and footnotes (EY 2018). Underwriters and lawyers conduct a “due diligence”
investigation that includes meetings with management, review of documents, background checks, and calls with
important customers and suppliers (STB 2016). Companies also often create a project management office lead by a
qualified advisory firm that organizes and monitors the IPO process and coordinates knowledge transfer between
involved parties (Protiviti 2021).

15

SECTION III. RESEARCH DESIGN
Tests of Pre-IPO Discretionary Accruals
My first measures of IPO audit service quality include absolute and signed pre-IPO
discretionary accruals. Higher values of absolute discretionary accruals indicate that auditors
allowed management to engage in more income-increasing or income-decreasing earnings
management, indicating lower audit quality because the financial statements less faithfully
reflect the company’s underlying economics (Johnson et al. 2002; DeFond and Zhang 2014). I
also examine signed discretionary accruals because there is greater risk to auditors for inflated
earnings so higher values reflect lower audit quality because the auditor was less conservative
(Becker et al. 1998; Heninger 2001; Lennox et al. 2016; Lee et al. 2019).
Pre-IPO discretionary accruals are estimated for the most recent fiscal year (year t-1)
(i.e., pre-IPO year) before the company goes public (year t) (i.e., IPO year). I estimate
discretionary accruals in two ways. First, I use the residual from the cross-sectional performanceadjusted modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995; Kothari et al. 2005) estimated for IPO
companies in my sample by two-digit SIC code after omitting companies in regulated industries
and financial companies (two-digit SIC codes 40-49 and 60–69).14 Second, I use the
performance-adjusted modified Jones model fit by 2-digit SIC to all available non-IPO
companies in Compustat during my sample period with non-missing assets, less than $1 billion
in annual revenues, and that use a Big 4 or Second-Tier auditor (Teoh et al. 1998; Ball and
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To calculate discretionary accruals, I use the following model:
TAi,t-1 = β0 + β1 (1/ASSETi,t−2) + β2 (ΔREVi,t-1 – Δ ARi,t-1) + β2 PPEi,t-1 + β3 ROAi,t−1 + ei,t-1, where t-1 is the pre-IPO
year for IPO company i; TA is total accruals, measured as earnings before extraordinary items (IB) minus net cash
flow from operations excluding extraordinary items (OANCF); ΔREV is the change in revenues; ΔAR is the change
in receivables; PPE is gross property, plant, and equipment; ROA is net income; and all variables are scaled by
lagged total assets. I use all available IPO observations in two-digit SIC industries with at least ten observations and
with at least $1 million in assets and revenues in the current and prior year. To minimize the impact of extreme
observations, I follow Ball and Shivakumar (2008) and trim variables entering the model at the ±1 percent level.
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Shivakumar 2008). I then apply the saved coefficients to IPO company data and the IPO
company residual reflects discretionary accruals. This alternative method could allow for a better
estimate of discretionary accruals because a larger number of observations are used to estimate
coefficients in the expected accruals model. It relies on the assumption that the non-discretionary
accruals of IPOs are determined in the same way as non-IPOs, which should be the case given
the subset of non-IPO companies used for the estimation share important characteristics with
IPOs in my sample (i.e., industry, revenues, auditor type).
To test whether auditor type is associated with absolute (ABS_DACC_1; ABS_DACC_2)
and signed (DACC_1; DACC_2) discretionary accruals I use the following model:
Disc. Accruals,t-1 = β0 + β1 BIG_4i,t-1 + β2 AGEi,t-1 + β3 AUD_CHANGEi,t-1 + β4 EGCi,t-1
+ β5 FOREIGNi,t-1 + β6 GROWTHi,t-1 + β7 LEVERAGEi,t-1 + β8 LITIGIOUSi,t-1
+ β9 LOSSi,t-1 + β10 PCT_RETAINEDi,t-1 + β11 PRESTIGIOUS_UWi,t-1
+ β12 PROCEEDSi,t-1 + β13 ROAi,t-1 + β14 SEGMENTSi,t-1 + β15 SIZEi,t-1
+ β16 TECHi,t-1 + β17 VCi,t-1 + βk Industry FE + βk Year FE + ei,t-1
(1)
where Industry and Year represent industry and year fixed effects, respectively; i represents IPO
company; and t-1 represents the pre-IPO year. A negative and significant coefficient on BIG_4
would suggest that Big 4 auditors provide higher IPO audit service quality. Equation (1) is
estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS) and robust standard errors. All variables are
defined in Appendix A.
My model is motivated by prior research on pre-IPO earnings quality measured through
discretionary accruals (e.g., Venkataram et al. 2008; Ball and Shivakumar 2008; Wongsunwai
2013). I control for financial performance using return on assets (ROA), the presence of a loss
(LOSS), and revenue growth (GROWTH) because financial performance is important to investor
assessments of company value (Brau and Fawcett 2006). I also control for the company’s
financial condition (LEVERAGE), size (SIZE), and the length of the company’s operating history
from its founding to the date of the IPO (AGE). I include controls for the complexity of the
17

company, including the number of total business and geographic segments (SEGMENTS) and the
presence of foreign operations (FOREIGN). I also control for whether the company is a
technology company (TECH) because they are more difficult to audit, with more intangible
assets and often reporting losses resulting from their high levels of research and development
expenditure (Demers and Joos 2007).
I include controls for litigation risk because audit quality is a function of the potential
litigation exposure faced by the client and its auditor (Palmrose 1988). Specifically, I include a
control for whether the company is in a litigious industry (LITIGIOUS) (Francis et al. 1994; Kim
and Skinner 2012), as well as for the size of the offering (PROCEEDS) because the upper limit
on damages suffered due to litigation under the Securities Act of 1933 is a function of the size of
the offering (Willenborg 1999). I also control for underwriter prestige (PRESTIGIOUS_UW)
because higher quality underwriters could restrict a company’s incentives for earnings
management to protect their reputation and avoid litigation risks (Jo et al. 2007). I control for the
presence of venture capital investment (VC) because venture capitalists play a monitoring role
and are associated with pre-IPO earnings management (Morsfield and Tan 2006). I control for
the percentage of the company retained by pre-IPO shareholders (PCT_RETAINED) because
Leland and Pyle (1977) argue that a high level of retained ownership is a positive signal about
the private information of managers. Managers could be more willing to manage earnings when
they have negative information about company value. I control for the presence of an auditor
change in the pre-IPO period (AUD_CHANGE) because auditors experience a learning curve that
could influence the quality of the services that they provide (Cassell et al. 2017). I also control
for whether the company is an emerging-growth company (EGC) because, following the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (JOBS) Act of 2012, EGC companies were allowed to provide
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reduced financial reporting disclosures. Reduced disclosure requirements could impact the
complexity of the pre-IPO audit or the reporting incentives of managers, which could influence
discretionary accruals.
Tests of SEC Accounting Comment Letters
My second measure of IPO audit service quality is the extent to which IPO companies are
initially compliant with SEC reporting guidelines. ACC_CMTS_1st is the number of accounting
comments in the SEC comment letter issued to the company following its initial review of the
registration statement. More accounting comments suggest that the SEC raised more accounting
treatment and disclosure concerns about the company. Because the IPO auditor provides
feedback to the company on the initial registration statement before it is submitted to the SEC
and because accounting comments often relate to audited financial information and disclosures,
more initial accounting comments suggest lower IPO audit service quality.
To test whether auditor type is associated with initial SEC accounting comments, I use
the following model:
ACC_CMTS_1sti = η0 + η1 BIG_4i,t-1 + η2 AGEi,t-1 + η3 AUD_CHANGEi,t-1 + η4 EGCi,t-1
+ η5 FOREIGNi,t-1 + η6 GROWTHi,t-1 + η7 LEVERAGEi,t-1 + η8 LITIGIOUSi,t-1
+ η9 LOSSi,t-1 + η10 PCT_RETAINEDi,t-1 + η11 PRESTIGIOUS_UWi,t-1
+ η12 PROCEEDSi,t-1 + η13 ROAi,t-1 + η14 SEGMENTSi,t-1 + η15 SIZEi,t-1
+ η16 TECHi,t-1 + η17 VCi,t-1 + ηk Industry FE + ηk Year FE + ei ,t-1
(2)
where the variables Industry and Year represent industry and year fixed effects, respectively; i
represents IPO company; and t-1 represents the pre-IPO year. A negative and significant
coefficient on BIG_4 would suggest that Big 4 auditors provide higher IPO audit service quality.
Equation (2) is estimated using OLS and robust standard errors. All variables are defined in
Appendix A.
I control for issuer size (SIZE), financial performance (ROA; GROWTH; LOSS) and
financial condition (LEVERAGE) because these factors could influence manager incentives for
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financial reporting and disclosure quality in the registration statement. I also control for
complexity (SEGMENTS; FOREIGN) because it may allow a company to conceal manipulation
of accounting information (Cassell et al. 2013b). I control for age (AGE) because prior research
documents older companies receive more SEC comment letters (Heese et al. 2017). I also
include indicator variables for the presence of venture capital investment (VC) and a prestigious
underwriter (PRESTIGIOUS_UW) because these parties could influence disclosure quality in the
registration statement (Köchling et al. 2021).
I control for litigation risk by including an indicator if the company is in a litigious
industry (LITIGOUS) and by including a control for the offering proceeds (PROCEEDS).
Venkataraman et al. (2008) argue that litigation exposure in IPO companies is a function of the
upper limit on damages under the Securities Act of 1933 and that auditor quality is influenced by
this litigation exposure. I also control for the portion of the company retained by pre-IPO
shareholders (PCT_RETAINED) because Leland and Pyle (1977) argue it is a signal about the
private information of managers and financial reporting and disclosure could vary with manager
knowledge about the prospects of the company.
I include an indicator variable for the presence of an auditor change in the pre-IPO period
(AUD_CHANGE) because new auditors experience a learning curve (Cassell et al. 2017). I
control for whether the IPO is an emerging-growth company (EGC) because EGC status permits
more limited disclosures, reducing the opportunity for SEC staff to identify accounting concerns.
I control for whether the company is a technology company (TECH) because they rely more
heavily upon intangible assets and often report significant accounting losses resulting from their
high levels of expenditures on research and development (Demers and Joos 2007). This could
make the audit more difficult or provide additional opportunities for SEC staff comments.
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SECTION IV. SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
As outlined in Table 1 Panel A, I construct my sample using the Securities Data
Corporation (SDC) database to identify all firm-commitment IPOs on major U.S. stock
exchanges (i.e., NASDAQ, NYSE, and AMEX) between January 1, 2005, and December 31,
2019. My sample begins after important SOX-related provisions went into effect, including
PCAOB inspections, requirements around the audit committee’s engagement of auditors,
prohibition of certain non-audit services, and stock exchange corporate governance requirements
(Nelson 2006). I limit my sample to IPO companies that issue common or Class A shares. I
exclude companies in regulated (two-digit SIC 40–49) and financial industries (two-digit SIC 6069). Removing companies in the financial industry excludes IPOs that are leveraged buyouts,
closed-end funds, open-end funds, trusts, special purpose acquisition companies, and special
purpose vehicles (Barth et al. 2017). These sample restrictions ensure that IPO companies in my
sample are conducting similar offerings and obtaining similar IPO audit services.
From SDC, I collect the IPO date, offering size, underwriter identity, venture capital
investment, and the number of shares offered as part of and outstanding after the IPO. I use
Audit Analytics to identify the IPO auditor, the emerging-growth status of the company, and
information on SEC comment letters.15 I obtain financial statement information in the pre-IPO
year and two years before the IPO year from Compustat and remove observations for which
control data are unavailable. I also remove observations with only one IPO in an industry during
my sample period (based on two-digit SIC code) because such observations can confound
interpretation of my variable of interest in models with industry fixed effects (DeHaan 2021).
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For 2.92% of the observations in my final sample, there exists no comment letter information in Audit Analytics. I
assume these companies receive no accounting comments. My inferences remain unchanged if I exclude these
observations from my sample.
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Table 1, Panel B shows that the proportion of Big 4 IPO audits has been generally
consistent over time. In nine of the fifteen years in my sample, Big 4 auditors provide between
80 and 90 percent of IPO audit services. In five of the fifteen years, they provide over 90 percent.
It is only in 2008 that Big 4 auditors provide less than 80 percent of IPO audits (75 percent), but
there were only eight total IPOs in my sample during this year due to the financial crisis.
Table 1, Panel C presents the number of total small and mid-sized IPO audits in my
sample by auditor type (i.e., Big 4 vs. Second-Tier) and by IPO company revenue in the pre-IPO
year. I partition revenues based on whether the IPO company had less than $100 million, $100 to
$500 million, or $500 million to $1 billion of pre-IPO year revenue. The table shows that Big 4
auditors provide between 87.0 and 88.2 percent of audits in all three revenue categories.
Although the market share of Second-Tier auditors is limited, the tables suggests that they
compete in all segments of the small and mid-sized IPO audit market.16
Table 1, Panel D shows the distribution of IPO audits by audit firm. Significant variation
exists in the market share of each of the Big 4, with Ernst and Young auditing the largest share of
small and mid-sized IPO audits (39.2 percent) and KPMG auditing the smallest share (12.4
percent). Grant Thornton and BDO have the first and second largest share of IPO audits among
Second-Tier auditors (5.3 percent and 3.9 percent, respectively).
Table 2, Panel A presents descriptive statistics for control variables in my models by
auditor type. IPO companies audited by the Big 4 are similar to those audited by Second-Tier
auditors along several important characteristics, such as assets (SIZE), revenues (REVENUE),
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Note that this figure does not consider the market share of non-annually inspected (i.e., small) auditors because I
do not include them in my final sample. When I include small auditor IPOs, I find that the Big 4 market share is
78.4% for companies with less than $100 million in revenues, 84.6% for companies between $100 and $500 million
in revenues, and 87.5% for companies with $500 million and $1 billion in revenues. Small auditors appear to only
compete for audits with less than $100 million in revenues. For these IPOs, I find that the average small auditor IPO
client has less than half the revenues and assets of the average Second-Tier and Big 4 client, confirming that small
auditors compete for a different group of IPO clients than other auditors.
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revenue growth (GROWTH), offering size (PROCEEDS), and the proportion of shares retained
by pre-IPO shareholders (PCT_RETAINED). The similarities across these characteristics support
the appropriateness of using a control group of Second-Tier IPO clients as a valid counterfactual
for the treatment group of Big 4 IPO clients.
However, IPO companies with Big 4 auditors are younger (AGE), less profitable (LOSS),
more complex (SEGMENTS), have more foreign operations (FOREIGN), and are more likely to
be in a litigious industry (LITIGIOUS). They are also more likely to be a technology company
(TECH), to have a reputable underwriter (PRESTIGIOUS_UW) and to receive venture capital
investment (VC). Still, there is considerable overlap along these dimensions.
Table 2, Panel B presents descriptive statistics and univariate comparisons for the
outcome variables in my models by auditor type. Mean absolute discretionary accruals
(ABS_DACC_1; ABS_DACC_2) are not statistically different across groups. However, mean
signed discretionary accruals (DACC_1; DACC_2) are negative for Big 4 IPO clients but
positive for Second-Tier IPO clients. This difference is statistically significant, suggesting that
Second-Tier IPO clients engage in more income-increasing earnings management. Big 4 IPO
clients receive fewer initial accounting comments (ACC_CMTS_1st, 4.85 vs. 5.74) and fewer
subsequent accounting comments (ACC_CMTS_SUBS, 3.95 vs. 5.21) and both differences are
statistically significant.
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SECTION V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The Association Between Pre-IPO Discretionary Accruals and Big 4 Auditors
Table 3 presents the relation between pre-IPO year discretionary accruals and the use of a
Big 4 auditor. In Column (1), the coefficient on BIG_4 is negative and significant (p<0.05); this
indicates that Big 4 clients are associated with lower absolute discretionary accruals than
Second-Tier clients (ABS_DACC_1). Column (2) shows the coefficient on BIG_4 is also
negative and significant (p<0.10) when the parameters for expected accruals are estimated using
a group of similar non-IPO companies rather than IPO companies in my sample (ABS_DACC_2).
Columns (1) and (2) indicate that absolute discretionary accruals are lower for Big 4 clients, or
that their financial statements more faithfully reflect the economic activities of the company,
suggesting higher IPO audit service quality.
In Column (3), the coefficient on BIG_4 is negative and significant (p<0.01); this
suggests that Big 4 clients are associated with lower signed discretionary accruals than SecondTier clients (DACC_1) (p<0.01). Column (4) shows that the coefficient on Big 4 is also negative
and significant (p<0.01) when the parameters for expected accruals are estimated using a group
of similar non-IPO companies (DACC_2). Columns (3) and (4) indicate that Big 4 auditors are
more conservative (i.e., more likely to require adjustments that reduce earnings), suggesting
higher IPO audit service quality.17
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In untabulated analyses, I examine whether performance-matched pre-IPO signed discretionary accruals differ for
Big 4 and Second-Tier IPO clients. I follow the portfolio-matching approach in Venkataraman et al. (2008).
Specifically, I use the Jones model (Jones 1991) and estimate discretionary accruals by 2-digit industry for
companies in my sample. I then sort companies within each 2-digit industry into quintiles by performance (i.e.,
lagged ROA, which is not included in the Jones model) and identify the median discretionary accrual in each
quintile. To calculate performance-matched discretionary accruals, I subtract the relevant median discretionary
accrual in each quintile from the IPO company’s discretionary accrual. Mean signed discretionary accruals are
negative for Big 4 IPOs (0.037) and positive for Second-Tier IPOs (0.062) and the difference is statistically different
from zero, suggesting Big 4 auditors are more conservative.
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The Association between SEC Accounting Comments and Big 4 Auditors
Table 4 presents the association between the extent of initial SEC accounting comments
related to the registration statement and the use of a Big 4 auditor. In Column (1), the coefficient
on BIG_4 is negative and significant; this indicates that Big 4 clients receive fewer initial
accounting comments (p<0.01). Because auditors provide clients advice on the draft registration
statement before it is submitted to the SEC, this finding suggest that Big 4 auditors are better
able to advise clients on achieving initial compliance with SEC reporting standards.
In Column (2), I examine the number of subsequent accounting comments received by
IPO companies. I use Model (2) and control for initial accounting comments, but also include an
interaction between ACC_CMTS_1st and BIG_4 to test whether the persistence of initial
accounting comments varies between Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors. If a company’s response
to an initial comment letter does not satisfy the SEC, it will issue subsequent accounting
comment(s) to the company on the matter. IPO auditors can influence the extent of subsequent
accounting comments by advising IPO clients on their response.
Column (2) shows that the interaction between ACC_CMTS_1st and BIG_4 is negative
and significant (p<0.10), suggesting that the association between initial accounting comments
and subsequent accounting comments is weaker for Big 4 IPO clients or that Big 4 auditors help
their clients more effectively address initial accounting issues raised by the SEC.18
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I also examine registration statement delay, or the number of days between when a company files its first and last
S-1 registration statement with the SEC. I find that that Big 4 (Second-Tier) IPO clients average 153 (157) days.
This supports the notion that the Big 4 and Second-Tier companies in my sample are similar. However, it is not a
strong measure of audit quality because a number of non-accounting related factors can influence the registration
statement delay (e.g., managerial desire to negotiate with the SEC during the process; new developments that
materially affect the company, etc.).
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Additional Analyses and Robustness Tests
Topics in Initial SEC Accounting Comments
Next, because an initial SEC comment letter typically includes multiple accounting
comments on different topics, I examine the accounting comment topics most frequently
received by auditor type.
Table 5, Panel A presents the fifteen most common accounting topics raised by the SEC
in initial SEC accounting comments on the registration statement for Big 4 and Second-Tier IPO
clients. Columns (1) and (2) show that the top five accounting topics are identical for both Big 4
and Second-Tier clients and include 1) Deferred, stock-based, and/or executive compensation 2)
Fair value measurement, estimates, and use 3) Debt, quasi-debt, warrants, and equity securities
4) Revenue recognition and 5) Earnings per share and income statement classification. Columns
(3) and (4) show that there is a sharp decline in the number and percentage of IPO clients,
respectively, receiving comments in the fifth through fifteenth most frequently observed topics.
In addition, 13 of the 15 topics are the same across auditor type. This suggests that Big 4 and
Second-Tier auditors are likely to face similar concerns during their IPO audits and that it is
reasonable to compare audit quality across the two auditor types for small and mid-sized IPOs. In
Figure 1, I present the frequency of accounting comment topics in initial SEC comment letters by
auditor type.
In Table 5, Panel B I present the average number of accounting topics by category for
Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors. I use a modified version of the Palmrose and Scholz (2004)
framework, as described in Cassell et al. (2013b), to categorize accounting topics into four
categories: Core Earnings (e.g., revenues, operating expenses), Non-Core Earnings (e.g.,
impairments, restructurings), Classification Issues (e.g., balance sheet and cash flow
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classification issues), and Fair Value issues. Core Earnings topics reflect issues related to
primary operating activities while Non-Core Earnings topics affect special one-time or nonoperating activities.
Panel B shows that for both Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors, comments relating to NonCore Earnings (NON_CORE_CMTS_1st) are the most common, followed by comments relating
to Core Earnings (NON_CORE_CMTS_1st), Fair Value (FV_CMTS_1st), and Classification
(CLASS_CMTS_1st). A univariate comparison of means across auditor type shows that Big 4
auditors receive fewer comments on topics relating to Non-Core Earnings, but that there is no
difference for across other topic categories. In untabulated multivariate regressions, I use Model
(2) and replace ACC_CMTS_1st with each of four accounting comment category variables,
similarly finding that Big 4 auditors only receive fewer comments relating to Non-Core Earnings
(p<0.01). Because Non-Core Earnings comments relate to one-time or non-operating activities,
these findings are consistent with the notion that Big 4 auditors have deep knowledge on a broad
range of accounting issues that allows them to provide high quality IPO audit services.
Robustness to Entropy Balancing
In Table 6, Column (1) I present a summary of the sign, magnitude, and statistical
significance of the coefficient on the variable of interest (i.e., BIG_4) for the main regressions in
my study. Overall, my results suggest that Big 4 auditors are associated with higher IPO audit
service quality, but a causal interpretation of this finding could be inappropriate.
Imbens and Rubin (2015) note that causal interpretation requires the unconfoundedness
assumption, or that the assignment of units to treatment does not depend on the potential
outcome. This assumption may not hold when investigating differences in audit quality between
Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors because Big 4 clients could have higher inherent financial
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reporting quality. Higher inherent financial reporting quality could impact the likelihood of
engaging a Big 4 auditor because Big 4 auditors may choose low-risk clients or because inherent
financial reporting quality influences the client’s demand for audit quality. It could also influence
the potential outcome because the audit quality measures that I use are based on client financial
reporting quality. However, it is unclear to what extent IPO auditor-client alignment is based on
inherent financial reporting quality and audit demand because private companies have not
previously had to comply with public company financial reporting standards and they have not
previously had to purchase an audit performed under PCAOB standards. In addition, I have
controlled for a number of observable company characteristics that should capture aspects of the
company’s financial reporting quality and demand for audit (e.g., size, growth, complexity,
leverage, etc.).
Although I cannot rule out the possibility that unobservable characteristics weaken the
unconfoundedness assumption, I seek to support the assumption regarding observable
characteristics associated with auditor choice and audit quality in several ways. I have limited
my sample to IPO companies with pre-IPO year revenues of less than $1 billion and my control
group to only Second-Tier auditors. If the assignment to treatment is confounded with the
potential outcome, the characteristics of the units in the treatment sample and those in the control
sample will systematically differ. Big 4 and Second-Tier clients in my sample are balanced on
important company characteristics, including assets, revenues, and growth. They are also
balanced on important offering characteristics, such as offering size and the percentage of shares
retained by pre-IPO shareholders.
While there are many similarities between Big 4 and Second-Tier IPO clients in my
sample, there also several differences. For instance, Big 4 clients are younger and less leveraged,
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have more foreign operations, and are more likely to use a prestigious underwriter and receive
venture capital investment. Given such differences, I employ entropy balancing, a technique that
assigns weights to observations such that those more likely to have received treatment (i.e., to
have engaged a Big 4 auditor) are assigned greater weights (Hainmueller 2012).19 Prior research
on Big 4 audit quality has similarly attempted to strengthen the unfoundedness assumption with
regard to observables by improving covariate balance across treatment and control samples
through data pre-processing techniques (Lawrence et al. 2011; DeFond et al. 2017).
In Table 6, Column (2) I present the results of my main tests when using an entropybalanced sample. My inferences remain unchanged.20
Litigation Risk and Litigation Outcomes
Auditors consider litigation risk in their client acceptance decisions because they are
concerned about the legal and reputational costs resulting from litigation (Johnstone and Bedard
2004; Schroeder and Hogan 2013). Relatedly, litigation risk is a driver of audit quality because
auditors take steps to mitigate risk stemming from low-quality financial reporting and disclosures
(Palmrose 1988). As discussed previously, litigation risk is higher for IPO companies than
already-public companies because they are subject to the Securities Act of 1933, which does not
require that a defendant makes a material omission or untruth in the registration statement with
knowledge or intent. A particular concern in my study is that litigation risk varies systematically
with the assignment to a Big 4 IPO audit and with observed audit quality, but that I have not
adequately controlled for it. I perform several analyses to assess whether this is likely.
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Recent research in accounting using entropy balancing includes Haislip et al. (2017), Ege, Glenn, and Robinson
(2020), and Laurion (2020), among others.
20
DeFond et al. (2017) argue there are at least two reasons why the Big 4 effect may not be attributable to selection
bias. First, Big 4 auditors’ competency should result in higher audit quality even for low-risk clients. Second, it is
difficult to explain the Big 4 audit fee premium if their clients have inherently higher financial reporting quality.
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I first examine how litigation risk varies between Big 4 and Second-Tier IPO clients. My
goal is to capture ex ante litigation risk because this is the risk relevant to auditors when deciding
whether to take on a pre-IPO client. I examine a set of client characteristics, motivated by Kim
and Skinner (2012), that could increase the risk of future securities class action lawsuit filings,
either through increasing the likelihood of price decline or the magnitude of potential damages.21
Kim and Skinner (2012) consider litigious industry membership, size, growth, and client return
characteristics such as stock volatility, stock turnover, stock returns, and stock skewness in the
period prior to the litigation period. The rationale for these variables is that “firms tend to get
sued after a period of unusually strong growth and/or stock price run up that subsequently
reverses and that the likelihood of litigation is higher for larger firms and firms with more
volatile stock returns” (Kim and Skinner 2012, p. 303). Because the stock of IPO companies is
not publicly traded, stock return data is not available, so I follow Lowry and Shu (2002) to
calculate IPO company return characteristics using a matched sample of peer non-IPO
companies in the same 3-digit SIC industry and within 80-120 percent of the IPO company’s
market capitalization. I also include the proceeds of the offering because it establishes the upper
limit on damages under the Securities Act of 1933 (Willenborg 1999; Venkataraman et al. 2008)
and the presence of venture capital investment (VC) and a prestigious underwriter
(PRESTIGE_UW) because these parties could influence auditor-client alignment through
expressed preferences of auditor type and a desire to avoid association with an IPO company that
experiences litigation.
In Table 7, Panel A I find some evidence that Big 4 IPO clients have higher ex ante
litigation risk. Big 4 clients are more likely to be in a litigious industry (LITIGIOUS) and have

21

Consistent with Kim and Skinner (2012), I examine ex ante litigation risk with regard to lawsuit filings because
auditors main goal is to avoid the legal, reputational, and time costs of a lawsuit filing.
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greater expected share turnover (PEER_TURNOVER). However, there are no differences across
auditor type along any of the six other ex ante litigation risk factors. I have controlled for
LITIGIOUS in my main analyses and my inferences are robust to including PEER_TURNOVER
in my models (untabulated).
It remains possible that these characteristics fail to capture a relevant aspect of ex ante
litigation risk that varies with the use of a Big 4 auditor. If this were the case, because ex ante
litigation risk should be associated with ex post litigation outcomes, a model of ex post litigation
outcomes on the use of a Big 4 auditor that controls for ex-ante litigation risk should reveal a
significant association on Big 4, reflecting the effect of a correlated omitted variable.22
In Table 7, Panel B I present the association between the filing of IPO-related lawsuits
and the use of a Big 4 auditor, controlling for ex ante litigation risk. I use the Audit Analytics
Legal database to obtain data on filed securities class action cases under the Securities Act of
1933. The models are motivated by Kim and Skinner (2012). The area under the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve is above 0.70 for all models, indicating acceptable
discriminatory power (Hosmer and Lemeshow 2002). Company size (SIZE) and stock return
volatility (PEER_VOLATILITY) appear to be the strongest predictors of filed IPO-related
lawsuits.23 Across all specifications, the coefficient on BIG_4 is insignificant, suggesting there is
no relation between the use of a Big 4 auditor and the filing of IPO-related lawsuits, alleviating
concerns of a correlated omitted variable related to ex ante litigation risk.
Table 7, Panel B also suggests that Big 4 IPO clients are not more likely to be named in

22

For example, a risk-seeking management culture could impact the likelihood that an IPO-related lawsuit is filed.
Big 4 auditors could be less likely to accept clients with a more risk-seeking management culture.
23
I find that the expected stock return measures are highly correlated (untabulated), explaining why
PEER_VOLATILITY is not significant in Column (4) of Table 7, Panel B. I also find that company size (SIZE) and
offering proceeds (PROCEEDS) are highly correlated and opt to include only SIZE in the litigation outcome
regressions. The coefficient on BIG_4 remains insignificant whether SIZE, PROCEEDS, or both variables are
included in the filed IPO-related lawsuit model.
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IPO-related litigation than Second-Tier IPO clients. Prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors
may be preferred in IPOs because they could reduce the risk of litigation against the IPO
company or underwriter and because their “deep pockets” allow for greater recovery in the event
of litigation (i.e., an insurance role) (Menon and Williams 1991; Willenborg 1999). Higher
quality auditors should be better able to reduce material omissions or untruths in the registration
statement, a necessary condition for IPO-related litigation. However, I find no significant
association between IPO-related litigation and the use of a Big 4 auditor after controlling for exante litigation risk.24
In Table 7, Panel C I show the frequency of filed IPO lawsuits by auditor type. Note that
these IPO lawsuits always name the IPO company as a defendant but may or may not name the
auditor as a defendant based on whether the plaintiff believes the material omission or
misstatement was related to the audited financial statements rather than other parts of the
registration statement. Regardless of whether the auditor is named in the lawsuit, auditors have
incentives to avoid their IPO clients being sued (e.g., reputational costs). I find that IPO clients
are sued in 7.65 percent of Big 4 IPO audits and in 8.40 percent of Second-Tier IPO audits, but
this difference is not statistically significant. While Big 4 auditors are more frequently named as
defendants in IPO lawsuits (0.87 percent and 0.00 percent), the small number of named auditors
in these lawsuits does not seem to suggest that IPO companies, their underwriters, or others
involved in the transaction should prefer Big 4 auditors because they expect a reduction in the
probability of IPO-related lawsuit filings.25

24

The absence of a relation between filed IPO lawsuits and the use of a Big 4 auditor could be explained if Big 4
auditors more effectively respond to ex ante litigation risk. To test whether this is the case, I use the model in
Column 3 of Table 7, Panel B and include an interaction between BIG_4 and either SIZE or PEER_VOLATILITY,
finding the coefficient on each is insignificant.
25
The rate at which auditors are named in IPO-related litigation appears reasonable because, according to
Cornerstone Research (2019), auditors were named as defendants in less than 1 percent of federal securities class
actions filed between 2015 and 2019. Venkataraman et al. (2008) find that auditors are sued in connection with 4%
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In Table 7, Panel D I show descriptive statistics on litigation outcomes and, for settled
cases, settlement amounts by auditor type. Lawsuits against Big 4 (Second-Tier) clients are
settled in 51.06% (50.00%) of cases. Lawsuits against Big 4 (Second-Tier) clients are dismissed
in 25.5% (37.5%) of cases. Big 4 clients settle for larger amounts ($7.04 million vs. $4.69
million) and these amounts constitute a greater proportion of the related clients’s assets,
revenues, and proceeds than settlements for Second-Tier clients. Second-Tier clients have larger
assets and revenues, but smaller IPO proceeds. Overall, while settlement amounts are larger for
Big 4 IPO clients, the low rate at which auditors are named in these lawsuit filings and the
relatively modest settlement amounts paid by their IPO clients suggest that those involved with
auditor selection should not prefer Big 4 auditors because their “deep pockets” allow for greater
recovery in the event of adverse legal events. Again, these inferences are limited to small and
mid-sized IPO companies.
Audit Fees
Prior research suggests that the decision to use a Big 4 auditor for the IPO is influenced
by cost considerations (Hogan 1997). Although documenting the Big 4 IPO audit fee premium
has not been the intent of prior work on IPO auditors and audit fees, models typically control for
the use of a Big 4 auditor and find that it is positively associated with IPO audit fees (e.g.,
Venkataraman et al. 2008; Khurana et al. 2019). However, these studies use non-Big 4 auditors
as their control group. The purpose of my analysis is to examine the difference in IPO audit fees
between Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors.

of IPOs from 1960 to 1993. The lower percentage of filed IPO lawsuits against auditors in my sample could be
attributable to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, which made it more difficult for investors to
bring securities-related lawsuits against auditors (Lee and Mande 2003).
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In Table 8 Panel A, I present descriptive statistics for IPO audit fees.26 Services related to
the IPO can be disclosed in either the pre-IPO year, the IPO year, or both years. The mean of
pre-IPO year audit fees for Big 4 (Second-Tier) auditors is $0.78 million ($0.47 million). The
mean of IPO year audit fees for Big 4 (Second-Tier) auditors is $1.29 million ($0.66 million).
The mean of total audit fees across both years for IPO companies with Big 4 (Second-Tier)
auditors is $2.07 million ($1.14 million).
In Table 8 Panel B, I present associations between the use of a Big 4 auditor and audit
fees for IPO companies. Theory suggests that audit fees are a function of the marginal cost of
auditing and expected losses from litigation (Simunic 1980). Consistent with prior research, I
include controls for factors documented to influence audit fees, including company size,
complexity, growth, profitability, age, litigation risk, and the presence of additional monitors and
advisors (i.e., underwriter prestige and venture capital investment) (Beatty 1993; Willenborg
1999; Hay et al. 2006, Venkataraman et al. 2008, Hay 2013). Because audit fees related to the
IPO can be disclosed in either the pre-IPO or the IPO year, I model this relation in three ways.
In Column (1), I examine the relation between the use of a Big 4 auditor and pre-IPO
year audit fees. All controls are measured as of the pre-IPO year. The coefficient on BIG_4 is
positive and significant (p<0.01). My results suggest that, after controlling for other factors that
influence audit fees, Big 4 clients pay 45.2% higher fees in the pre-IPO, equivalent to $0.34
million higher audit fees for a representative IPO in my sample.27

26

IPO audit fees are disclosed in the proxy statement filed by the company after it goes public. The audit fee
category in the proxy can include fees paid for the audit of the registrant’s annual financial statements, review of the
quarterly financial statements, and services normally provided by the accountant in connection with statutory and
regulatory filings or engagements. Audit fees can also include fees which generally only the independent accountant
can reasonably provide, such as comfort letters, statutory audits, attest services, consents, and assistance with and
review of documents filed with the SEC. See SEC Release No. 33-8183; 34-47265; 35-27642; IC-25915; IA-2103,
68 FR 6006 (February 5, 2003). http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8183.htm.
27
The Big 4 pre-IPO year audit fee premium is calculated as (e0.373 – 1)*100 = 45.2%. To calculate the economic
significance, I multiply the sample mean of pre-IPO year audit fees ($0.74 million) by 45.2%.
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In Column (2), I examine the relation between the use of a Big 4 auditor and IPO year
audit fees. All controls are measured as of the IPO year. I find that Big 4 IPO clients pay
significantly higher IPO year audit fees (p<0.01). My results suggest that Big 4 clients pay
65.9% higher fees in the IPO year, equivalent to $0.80 million higher audit fees for a
representative IPO in my sample.28,29
In Column (3), I examine the relation between audit fees and the use of a Big 4 IPO
auditor where the audit fees include the sum of pre-IPO and IPO year audit fees. I find that Big 4
IPO clients pay higher audit fees (p<0.01). My results suggest that Big 4 IPO clients pay 63.07%
higher fees over the pre-IPO and IPO year, equivalent to $1.24 million higher audit fees for a
representative IPO in my sample.30 Overall, my results suggest that Big 4 IPO clients between
45.2% and 65.9% higher audit fees for services related to the IPO.

The Big 4 IPO year audit fee premium is calculated as (e0.506 – 1)*100 = 65.90%. To calculate the economic
significance, I multiply the sample mean of IPO year audit fees ($1.22 million) by 65.90%.
29
Note that AUD_CHANGE is missing when my regression includes IPO year audit fees because if a company
switches auditors between going public and the filing of its first proxy statement, only the newly appointed auditor
(who didn’t work on the IPO) is required to disclose audit fees.
30
The Big 4 IPO audit fee premium is calculated as (e0.489 – 1)*100 = 63.1%. To calculate the economic
significance, I multiply the sample mean of the sum of pre-IPO year and IPO year audit fees ($1.96 million) by
63.1%.
28
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SECTION VI. CONCLUSION
In this study, I examine whether IPO audit service quality differs between Big 4 and
Second-Tier auditors for a sample of small and mid-sized IPOs. Big 4 auditors perform most
initial public offering (IPO) audits, but there is limited empirical evidence on whether they
provide higher IPO audit service quality. Collectively, my results suggest that Big 4 auditors
provide higher IPO audit service quality than Second-Tier auditors, as evidenced by lower
discretionary accruals and fewer initial subsequent accounting comments.
Prior research suggests that Big 4 auditors could be preferred in IPOs because they play a
more effective “information signaling” role by enhancing the credibility of financial information,
allowing companies to better signal their value and reducing the costs faced by underwriters and
investors when gathering information about the company. My findings suggest that such
perceived differences could be grounded in the higher actual quality of Big 4 IPO audit services,
but I leave an investigation of whether this is the case for future research. Still, I conclude that
companies that demand the highest level of audit quality in their IPOs may wish not to seek
Second-Tier auditors as a Big 4 alternative.
Prior research also suggests that Big 4 auditors may be preferred in IPOs because they
could reduce the risk of litigation against the IPO company or underwriter and because their
“deep pockets” allow for greater recovery in the event of litigation (i.e., an “insurance role”). I
find no significant association between IPO-related litigation and auditor type. In addition, most
cases are settled and average settlement amounts are modest, suggesting that Second-Tier
auditors should be able to provide sufficient coverage in the case of litigation.
My results suggest that the benefits of using a Big 4 auditor come at a considerable cost
in the form of higher IPO audit fees. The decision to hire a Big 4 auditor ultimately requires an
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assessment of the costs and benefits associated with the choice and my study provides evidence
that should be useful for those who influence auditor selection.
In addition, regulators have expressed interest in expanding IPO audit market
competition. Although I find that Second-Tier auditors provide lower audit quality relative to Big
4 auditors, it is possible that the quality of audit services that they provide is sufficiently high for
many companies preparing to IPO, particularly those concerned about the costs associated with
going public. As a starting point, regulators interested in promoting IPO audit market
competition in the small and mid-sized segment of the IPO audit market can do so by bringing
attention to the costs and benefits of using Big 4 auditors. While the audit committees of alreadypublic companies are required to oversee the appointment of the external auditor, IPO auditors
are typically selected by management while a company is still private. Evidence suggests that
underwriters and other stakeholders can pressure companies into using Big 4 auditors. Therefore,
it is possible that the current IPO audit market concentration for small and midcap IPOs does not
reflect the true company demand for Second-Tier audit services. Consequently, I reiterate calls
for required disclosure of agreements with third parties that restrict IPO auditor choice (ACAP
2008).
I observe that the literature on IPO auditors is limited and that most inferences are drawn
from studies using pre-SOX samples. The significant regulatory changes from the passage of
SOX and the significant audit market changes from the demise of Arthur Andersen, the exit of
smaller auditors from the market (DeFond and Lennox 2011), and the growth of Second-Tier
auditors suggest that such inferences may not be generalizable to the post-SOX period. I
encourage further research in the IPO audit setting.
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APPENDIX A
Variable Definitions
Variable Name
ABS_DACC_1

ABS_DACC_2

ACC_CMTS_1st

ACC_CMTS_SUBS

AGE

Variable Definition
The absolute value of pre-IPO discretionary accruals
estimated from the performance-adjusted modified
Jones model for IPO companies in my sample;
The absolute value of pre-IPO discretionary accruals
estimated from the performance-adjusted modified
Jones model where coefficients are obtained by
fitting the model to all available non-IPO companies
in Compustat during my sample period with nonmissing assets, less than $1 billion in annual
revenues, and that use a Big 4 or Second-Tier
auditor;
The number of Accounting Rule and Disclosure
Issue comments in the first SEC comment letter
related to the Form S-1 registration statement;
The number of Accounting Rule and Disclosure
Issue comments in comment letters subsequent to
the first SEC comment letter related to the form S-1
registration statement;
The natural log of firm age, calculated as the
difference between the year of the IPO and the
founding year of the IPO company;

Source
Compustat

Compustat

Audit
Analytics
Audit
Analytics

Jay
Ritter’s
Website

AUD_CHANGE

1 if the company switches auditors in the year before Audit
the IPO year, and 0 otherwise;
Analytics

AUD_FEES

The natural log of audit fees. Audit fees reflect
amounts disclosed in the DEF 14A proxy filed after
the company goes public;
1 if the company is audited by Deloitte, KPMG,
Ernst and Young, or PwC, and 0 otherwise;

Audit
Analytics

The total number of classification accounting issues
raised by the SEC in their initial comment letter
related to the registration statement. Issues are
identified using Audit Analytics Comment Letters
variable ISS_ACCRL_DISC_KEYS. Issues are then
categorized as classification issues following Cassell
et al. (2013b);
The total number of non-core accounting issues
raised by the SEC in their initial accounting
comment letter related to the registration statement.
Issues are identified using Audit Analytics Comment
Letters variable ISS_ACCRL_DISC_KEYS. Issues

Audit
Analytics

BIG_4
CLASS_CMTS_1st

CORE_CMTS_1st
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Audit
Analytics

Audit
Analytics

are then categorized as non-core issues following
Cassell et al. (2013b);
DACC_1

DACC_2

EGC

FOREIGN
FV_CMTS_1st

GROWTH
LEVERAGE
LITIGIOUS

LOSS
NONCORE_CMTS_1st

The signed value of pre-IPO discretionary accruals
estimated from the performance-adjusted modified
Jones model for IPO companies in my sample;
The signed value of pre-IPO discretionary accruals
estimated from the performance-adjusted modified
Jones model where coefficients are obtained by
fitting the model to all available non-IPO companies
in Compustat during my sample period with nonmissing assets, less than $1 billion in annual
revenues, and that use a Big 4 or Second-Tier
auditor;

Compustat

1 if the company files an IPO as an Emerging
Growth Company under the JOBS Act of 2012, and
zero otherwise;
1 if the company has pre-tax foreign income or loss,
and 0 otherwise;
The total number of fair value accounting issues
raised by the SEC in their initial comment letter
related to the registration statement. Issues are
identified using Audit Analytics Comment Letters
variable ISS_ACCRL_DISC_KEYS. Issues are then
categorized as fair value issues following Cassell et
al. (2013b);
The change in revenues as a proportion of prior year
assets;
The ratio of total long-term debt to total assets;
1 if a company is in a high litigation industry, as
those defined by Francis et al. (1994) and used by
Kim and Skinner (2012). High-litigation industries
include: biotechnology (SIC codes 2833-2836),
computers (3570-3577 and 7370-7374), electronics
(3600-3674), and retailing (5200-5961);

Audit
Analytics

1 if the company has negative net income, and 0
otherwise;
The total number of non-core accounting issues
raised by the SEC in their initial comment letter
related to the registration statement. Issues are
identified using Audit Analytics Comment Letters
variable ISS_ACCRL_DISC_KEYS. Issues are then
categorized as non-core issues following Cassell et
al. (2013b);

Compustat
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Compustat

Compustat
Audit
Analytics

Compustat
Compustat
Compustat

Audit
Analytics

PCT_RETAINED

The percent of post-IPO shares outstanding retained
by pre-IPO shareholders;

SDC

PEER_RETURNS

The average buy-and-hold returns for a matched
sample of non-IPO companies during the year
before the IPO date;
The average skewness of returns for a matched
sample of non-IPO companies during the year
before the IPO date;
The average monthly stock turnover for a matched
sample of non-IPO companies during the year
before the IPO date;
The average standard deviation of monthly returns
for a matched sample of non-IPO companies during
the year before the IPO date;
1 if the IPO is underwritten by a prestigious
underwriter, defined as being in the Top 10
Underwriter Rank per Jay Ritter's underwriter
ranking, and 0 otherwise;
The natural log of the total number of shares issued
in the IPO multiplied by the IPO offer price in
millions;
Net income scaled by average assets;
1 if the IPO auditor is annually inspected by the
PCAOB in the year of the IPO. Second-Tier auditors
include BDO, Grant Thornton, Marcum (since
2014), RSM (McGladrey before 2015);
The natural log of the number of business and
geographic segments;
The natural log of total assets;
1 if the IPO company was the defendant in a class
action lawsuit brought under the Securities Act of
1933, and 0 otherwise;
1 if the IPO company is a technology company
based on the Loughran and Ritter (2004)
classification;
1 if the company received venture backing, and 0
otherwise.

CRSP

PEER_SKEWNESS

PEER_TURNOVER

PEER_VOLATILITY

PRESTIGIOUS_UW

PROCEEDS

ROA
SECOND_TIER

SEGMENTS
SIZE
SUED_IPO

TECH

VC
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CRSP

CRSP

CRSP

SDC and
Jay
Ritter's
Website
SDC

Compustat
Audit
Analytics

Compustat
Compustat
Audit
Analytics
Compustat

SDC

Frequency of Accounting Topics in Initial SEC Comment Letter
by Auditor Type
Percent of Auditor's IPO Portfolio with
Topic in Initial SEC Comment Letter

Big 4

Second-Tier

100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%

20%
10%
0%

Deferred,
Fair value
Debt, quasistock-based, measurement, debt, warrants,
and/or
estimates, and and equity
executive
use
security
compensation

Revenue
recognition

EPS and
income
statement
classification

Research and
development

Segment
reporting

Acquisitions,
mergers, and
business
combinations

Tax

Intangible
assets and
goodwill

Accounting Topic
FIGURE 1
Frequency of Accounting Comment Topics in Initial SEC Comment Letter by Auditor Type
This figure presents the frequency of accounting comment topics in initial SEC comment letters issued to IPO companies by auditor
type. The percentage of each auditor type’s IPO portfolio with a topic in the initial SEC comment letter is calculated as the total
number of IPO clients receiving an initial comment letter on the respective topic divided by the total number of IPO clients in the
auditor’s IPO portfolio. An initial accounting comment letter can include multiple accounting comment topics.
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TABLE 1
Sample Selection and Composition
Panel A: Sample Selection
U.S. firm-commitment IPOs on major exchanges (NASDAQ, NYSE, AMEX)
from January 1, 2005 through December 31, 2019 from the Securities Data
Corporation (SDC) New Issues Database
Less:
IPO companies that sell securities other than common or Class A shares
IPO companies missing pre-IPO year control variables in Compustat
IPO companies without registration statement financial statement audit
opinion data in Audit Analytics
IPO companies without registration statement filing information in WRDS
SEC Filings
IPO companies in financial (SIC 60-69) and regulated industries (SIC 40-49),
including leveraged buyouts, closed-end funds, open-end funds, trusts,
special purpose acquisition companies, and special purpose vehicles
IPO companies with non-Big 4 auditors that are not annually inspected by the
PCAOB in the IPO year
IPO companies with revenues greater than $1 billion in the year before the IPO
IPO companies in SIC2 industries with only one IPO
Total observations for SEC registration statement review tests
Starting sample for discretionary accruals tests
Less IPO Companies:
With assets or revenues less than $1 million in the pre-IPO year
With assets or revenues less than $1 million two years before the IPO year
In two-digit SIC industries with fewer than ten IPOs during the sample
period
Trim inputs to the performance-adjusted modified Jones model at
the 1st and 99th percentiles
Total observations for discretionary accruals tests
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2,435

(423)
(553)
(92)
(163)
(227)
(79)
(100)
(10)
788
788
(167)
(34)
(86)
(39)
462

TABLE 1 Continued
Panel B: Frequency of IPOs by IPO Year and Auditor Type
IPO Year
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
Total

Big 4
48
55
57
6
19
36
35
40
63
88
55
30
42
67
52
693

Second-Tier
3
8
10
2
2
6
5
9
7
12
9
4
8
6
4
95

Total
51
63
67
8
21
42
40
49
70
100
64
34
50
73
56
788

% of IPOs
with Big 4 auditor
94.1%
87.3%
85.1%
75.0%
90.5%
85.7%
87.5%
81.6%
90.0%
88.0%
85.9%
88.2%
84.0%
91.8%
92.9%
87.9%

Panel C: Frequency of IPO Clients by pre-IPO Year Revenue and Auditor Type
Pre-IPO year revenues
Big 4
Second Tier
Total IPOs
% with Big 4 auditor
< $100 million
443
59
502
88.2%
$100 – 500 million
203
29
232
87.5%
$500 – 1,000 million
47
7
54
87.0%
Total IPOs
693
95
788
87.9%
Panel D: Frequency of IPO Clients by Auditor
Auditor Name
IPO Audit Clients
309
Ernst and Young
162
PricewaterhouseCoopers
124
Deloitte
98
KPMG
42
Grant Thornton
31
BDO
15
RSM
7
Marcum
Total
788
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% of Total IPOs
39.2%
20.6%
15.7%
12.4%
5.3%
3.9%
1.9%
0.9%
100%

TABLE 2
Descriptive Statistics
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Control Variables by Auditor Type
Big 4 (N=693)
Second-Tier (N=95)
Variable
Mean
P25
P50
P75
Mean
P25
P50
AGE
13.225
6.000
9.000
14.000
18.284
7.000
14.000
AUD_CHANGE
0.032
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.084
0.000
0.000
EGC
0.597
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.537
0.000
1.000
FOREIGN
0.371
0.000
0.000
1.000
0.168
0.000
0.000
GROWTH
0.397
0.001
0.192
0.596
0.299
0.017
0.170
LEVERAGE
0.213
0.000
0.051
0.278
0.371
0.000
0.200
LITIGIOUS
0.765
1.000
1.000
1.000
0.547
0.000
1.000
LOSS
0.716
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.579
0.000
1.000
PCT_RETAINED
0.754
0.697
0.768
0.832
0.749
0.664
0.749
PRESTIGIOUS_UW
0.743
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.442
0.000
0.000
PROCEEDS
138.502 68.200 96.000 151.300
121.340 49.200 75.000
ROA
-0.450
-0.676 -0.234
0.017
-0.621
-0.596
-0.040
REVENUES
133.683 3.598 58.698 167.312
142.155 4.302
52.897
SEGMENTS
3.009
2.000
2.000
4.000
2.663
2.000
2.000
SIZE
202.076 37.641 72.313 191.143
217.461 19.236 61.212
TECH
0.229
0.000
0.000
0.000
0.189
0.000
0.000
VC
0.724
0.000
1.000
1.000
0.453
0.000
0.000

P75
22.000
0.000
1.000
0.000
0.481
0.641
1.000
1.000
0.837
1.000
132.000
0.041
203.117
3.000
277.204
1.000
1.000

Diff. in Means
Diff.
P-val.
-5.059*** 0.002
-0.052** 0.012
0.061
0.261
0.202*** 0.000
0.097
0.110
-0.158*** 0.001
0.217*** 0.000
0.137*** 0.006
0.005
0.720
0.301*** 0.000
17.162
0.275
0.170*
0.076
-8.471
0.694
0.346**
0.048
-15.385
0.685
0.040
0.382
0.272*** 0.000

This table presents descriptive statistics for the control variables in my sample. Descriptive statistics for AGE, PROCEEDS, SEGMENTS, and SIZE are before
the logarithmic transformation. Big 4 auditors include Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and PwC. Second-Tier auditors are non-Big 4 auditors that are annually inspected
by the PCAOB in the year of the IPO and include BDO, Grant Thornton, Marcum (since 2014), and RSM (McGladrey before 2015). The *,**,*** indicate
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 2 Continued
Panel B: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables by Auditor Type
Big 4
Second-Tier
Variables
N
Mean
P50
SD
N Mean
P50
Accrual Measures
ABS_DACC_1
419 0.159 0.099 0.186
43 0.194 0.098
ABS_DACC_2
419 0.167 0.102 0.206
43 0.175 0.105
DACC_1
419 -0.014 0.004 0.245
43 0.091 0.058
DACC_2
419 -0.040 0.001 0.262
43 0.084 0.074

0.224
0.186
0.283
0.241

-0.035
-0.008
-0.105***
-0.125***

0.252
0.802
0.009
0.003

0.001
-0.003
-0.054**
-0.083***

0.873
0.873
0.016
0.002

SEC Review Measures
ACC_CMTS_1st
693
ACC_CMTS_SUBS
693

3.725
6.028

-0.887**
-1.265**

0.016
0.021

-1.000**
-1.000

0.029
0.329

4.850
3.945

4.000 3.313
2.000 4.846

95
95

5.737
5.211

5.000
3.000

SD

Diff. in Means
Diff.
P-val.

Diff. in Medians
Diff.
P-val.

This table presents descriptive statistics for dependent variables in my sample. The full sample includes 788 IPOs, where 693 IPOs use a Big 4 auditor and 95
IPOs use a Second-Tier auditor. The descriptive presented for the discretionary accrual measures are for a sample of 501 IPOs, where 447 IPOs use a Big 4
auditor and 54 IPOs use a Second-Tier auditor. The accruals sample is smaller due to additional data requirements for the estimation of total accruals, as
shown in Table 1 Panel A. Big 4 auditors include Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and PwC. Second Tier auditors are non-Big 4 auditors that are annually inspected by
the PCAOB in the year of the IPO and include BDO, Grant Thornton, Marcum (since 2014), and RSM (McGladrey before 2015). The *,**,*** indicate
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 3
Pre-IPO Discretionary Accruals and the Use of a Big 4 Auditor
(1)
(2)
ABS_DACC_1
ABS_DACC_2
Variables
Coef.
P-val.
Coef.
BIG_4
-0.058*
0.026
-0.032*
AGE
-0.018
0.368
-0.011
AUD_CHANGE
0.128**
0.044
0.172**
EGC
-0.038
0.221
0.004
FOREIGN
-0.028
0.155
-0.027
GROWTH
0.145***
0.000
0.161***
LEVERAGE
0.012
0.729
-0.008
LITIGIOUS
-0.067
0.223
-0.029
LOSS
-0.026
0.270
-0.043*
PCT_RETAINED
-0.009
0.898
-0.022
PRESTIGOUS_UW
-0.001
0.967
-0.013
PROCEEDS
-0.034*
0.076
-0.023
ROA
-0.144**
0.011
-0.199***
SEGMENTS
-0.004
0.867
-0.003
SIZE
0.017
0.162
0.020
TECH
0.021
0.384
0.029
VC
0.009
0.674
-0.006
Observations
462
462
2
Adj. R
0.254
0.266
Industry FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES

P-val.
0.094
0.599
0.027
0.894
0.214
0.000
0.814
0.625
0.093
0.779
0.593
0.258
0.002
0.895
0.137
0.232
0.829

(3)
DACC_1
Coef.
-0.103***
-0.025
-0.147
-0.063
0.012
0.011
-0.050
0.074
-0.006
-0.179**
0.015
-0.036
0.238***
-0.034
-0.005
-0.040
0.006
462
0.112
YES
YES

P-val.
0.009
0.365
0.126
0.229
0.676
0.796
0.301
0.300
0.855
0.022
0.657
0.196
0.001
0.322
0.775
0.213
0.837

(4)
DACC_2
Coef.
-0.096***
-0.032
-0.152
-0.094*
0.018
-0.082*
-0.048
0.056
-0.017
-0.210**
0.012
-0.016
0.307***
-0.039
-0.027
-0.026
0.008
462
0.179
YES
YES

P-val.
0.009
0.227
0.143
0.051
0.550
0.080
0.288
0.406
0.631
0.012
0.734
0.565
0.000
0.244
0.164
0.404
0.800

This table presents linear regressions of pre-IPO discretionary accruals and the use of a Big 4 auditor. ABS_DACC_1 (DACC_1) is the absolute (signed) value
of discretionary accruals and expected accruals are estimated using the performance-adjusted modified Jones model for IPO companies in my sample.
ABS_DACC_2 (DACC_2) is the absolute (signed) value of discretionary accruals and expected accruals are estimated by fitting the modified Jones
performance-adjusted model to all available non-IPO companies in Compustat during my sample period with non-missing assets, less than $1 billion in annual
revenues, and that use a Big 4 or Second-Tier auditor. I then apply the saved coefficients to IPO company data. The *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at
the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels using one tailed p-values for the variable of interest and two-tailed p-values for all other variables and are derived from test
statistics based on robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 4
SEC Accounting Comments and the Use of a Big 4 Auditor
(1)
(2)
st
ACC_CMTS_1
ACC_CMTS_SUBS
Variables
Coef.
P-val.
Coef.
BIG_4
-0.913***
0.006
0.939
st
ACC_CMTS_1
1.078***
st
BIG_4 x ACC_CMTS_1
-0.237*
AGE
-0.370
-0.323
0.157
AUD_CHANGE
-0.031
0.102
0.858
EGC
0.682
0.039
0.954
FOREIGN
-0.475
0.158
0.534
GROWTH
-0.040
0.175
0.393
LEVERAGE
0.345
0.189
0.495
LITIGIOUS
1.695**
0.672
0.257
LOSS
-0.467
-0.643*
0.050
PCT_RETAINED
-1.939
-1.217
0.197
PRESTIGIOUS_UW
-0.335
-0.265
0.304
PROCEEDS
0.105
-0.308
0.166
ROA
-0.029
-0.021
0.884
SEGMENTS
-0.310
0.854**
0.015
SIZE
0.009
0.488***
0.001
TECH
-0.891
-0.190
0.605
VC
0.225
-0.184
0.533
BIG_4 +
1.300
BIG_4 x ACC_CMTS_1st
ACC_CMTS_1st +
84.450***
BIG_4 x ACC_CMTS_1st
Observations
Adj. R2
Industry FE
Year FE

788
0.376
YES
YES

P-val.
0.102
0.000
0.067
0.209
0.960
0.389
0.224
0.892
0.305
0.044
0.367
0.125
0.400
0.758
0.897
0.522
0.976
0.174
0.654
0.255
0.000

788
0.421
YES
YES

This table presents linear regressions of the association between the number of accounting comments in SEC
comment letters related to the Form S-1 registration statement and the use of a Big 4 auditor. In Column (1),
ACC_CMTS_1st is the number of accounting comments in the initial SEC comment letter. In Columns (2),
ACC_CMTS_SUBS is the number of accounting comments in subsequent SEC comment letters. The *,**,***
indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels using one tailed p-values for the variable of
interest and two-tailed p-values for all other variables and are derived from test statistics based on robust standard
errors. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 5
Accounting Topics in Initial SEC Comment Letters
Panel A: Frequency of Accounting Topics in Initial SEC Comment Letters by Auditor
Type
Big 4 IPO Clients (N=693)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Rank Accounting Issue Topic
Num. of
% of
Issue
Clients
Clients
Category
with Issue
1
Deferred, stock-based, and/or executive
506
73.02%
Non-Core
compensation
2
Fair value measurement, estimates, and
488
70.42%
Fair Value
use
3
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants, and equity
361
52.09%
Non-Core
security
4
Revenue recognition
346
49.93%
Core
5
EPS and income statement classification
148
21.36%
Classification
6
Research and development
131
18.90%
Core
7
Segment reporting
122
17.60%
Classification
8
Acquisitions, mergers, and business
119
17.17%
Non-Core
combinations
9
Tax
116
16.74%
Non-Core
10
Intangible assets and goodwill
106
15.30%
Non-Core
11
Inventory, vendor, and/or cost of sales
98
14.14%
Core
12
Contingencies and commitments
98
14.14%
Non-Core
13
Liabilities, payables, and accrual estimates
96
13.85%
Core
14
Accounts receivable and cash reporting
69
9.96%
Core
15
Expenses
62
8.95%
Core
Second-Tier IPO Clients (N=95)
(1)
(2)
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6

Accounting Issue Topic
Deferred, stock-based, and/or executive
compensation
Fair value measurement, estimates, and
use
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants, and equity
security
Revenue recognition
EPS and income statement classification
Intangible assets and goodwill
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(3)
Num. of
Clients
with Issue
69

(4)

(5)

% of
Clients

Issue
Category

71.9%

Non-Core

67

69.8%

Fair Value

56

58.3%

Non-Core

49
27
27

51.0%
28.1%
28.1%

Core
Classification
Non-Core

TABLE 5 Continued
7
Acquisitions, mergers, and business
combinations
8
Tax
9
Segment reporting
10
Inventory, vendor, and/or cost of sales
11
Contingencies and commitments
12
Fixed Assets
13
Accounts receivable and cash reporting
14
Research and Development
15
Liabilities, payables, and accrual estimate
issues

25

26.0%

Non-Core

25
22
19
19
17
16
15
15

26.0%
22.9%
19.8%
19.8%
17.7%
16.7%
15.6%
15.6%

Non-Core
Classification
Core
Non-Core
Non-Core
Core
Core
Core

This table presents the fifteen most common accounting issues identified in initial SEC comment letters related to
the Form S-1 registration statement for Big 4 and Second-Tier IPO audit clients. Of the 693 (95) Big 4 (SecondTier) observations in my sample, 630 (89) receive at least one initial accounting comment. Of the observations
with at least one initial accounting comment, I identify the issue topic(s) that each initial accounting comment
relates to by using Audit Analytics. Columns (1) and (2) present the rank of the most frequently occurring issue
topics for IPO clients of Big 4 and Second-Tier auditors. Column (3) presents the number of IPOs with the
respective issue. Column (4) presents the percent of clients in the auditor’s IPO portfolio with the respective
issue. See Figure 1 for a visual representation. In Column (5), issue topics are further categorized as either Core,
Non-Core, Classification, or Fair Value issues following Cassell et al. (2013b).

Panel B: Accounting Topic Categories in Initial SEC Comment Letters by Auditor Type
Big 4
Second-Tier
Diff. in Means
(N = 693)
(N = 95)
Variables
Mean
P50
Mean
P50
Diff.
P-val.
ACC_CMTS_1st
4.850
3.313
5.737 3.725
-0.887**
0.016
st
CORE_CMTS_1
1.310
1.332
1.463 1.479
-0.153
0.301
st
NONCORE_CMTS_1
2.335
1.855
3.063 2.163
-0.728*** 0.001
st
CLASS_CMTS_1
0.512
0.752
0.600 0.817
-0.088
0.292
FV_CMTS_1st
0.704
0.457
0.653 0.479
0.052
0.305
This table presents descriptive statistics for initial SEC accounting comment issue categories by auditor type.
Topic categories follow Cassell et al. (2013b). The descriptive statistics in this table are calculated for all
observations in my sample. The *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. All
variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 6
Entropy Balancing

Outcomes
Disc. Accruals
ABS_DACC_1
ABS_DACC_2
DACC_1
DACC_2
Acct. Comments
ACC_CMTS_1ST
ACCT_CMTS_SUBS
Controls
Industry FEs
Year FEs

Var. of Interest

(1)
Before
Entropy Balancing
Coef.
P-val.

(2)
After
Entropy Balancing
Coeff
P-val.

BIG_4
BIG_4
BIG_4
BIG_4

-0.058**
-0.032*
-0.103***
-0.096***

0.026
0.094
0.009
0.009

-0.063**
-0.048**
-0.142***
-0.162***

0.011
0.012
0.000
0.000

BIG_4
BIG_4 x
ACCT_CMTS_1st

-0.913***

0.006

-0.537*

0.058

-0.237*

0.067

-0.307**

0.019

YES
YES
YES

YES
YES
YES

This table presents the sign, magnitude, and statistical significance of the coefficient for the variable of interest in
the main tests of my study before and after the use of entropy-balancing (Heinmuller 2012). When using entropybalancing, I achieve balanced covariates along the first and second moment for all regressors in my models.
Column (1) presents information on coefficients before entropy balancing. Column (2) presents information on
coefficients after entropy balancing. The *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels
using one tailed p-values for the variable of interest and two-tailed p-values for all other variables and are derived
from test statistics based on robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 7
Litigation Risk and Litigation Outcomes
Panel A: Ex-Ante Litigation Risk and the Use of a Big 4 Auditor
Big 4
Second-Tier
(N=693)
(N=95)
Mean
Mean
Ex-Ante Litigation Risk Measures
GROWTH
0.397
0.299
LITIGIOUS
0.765
0.547
PEER_RETURNS
0.227
0.196
PEER_SKEWNESS
0.311
0.311
PEER_TURNOVER
2.245
1.814
PEER_VOLATILITY
0.151
0.145
PROCEEDS
138.502
121.340
SIZE
202.076
217.461

Diff. in Means
Diff.

P-val.

0.097
0.217***
0.031
0.000
0.431***
0.006
17.162
-15.385

0.110
0.000
0.669
0.995
0.000
0.254
0.275
0.685

This table presents descriptive statistics for several ex-ante litigation risk measures by auditor type. Variables that
begin with ‘PEER_’ are calculated for a matched sample of non-IPO companies during the twelve months before
the IPO date. The matched sample consists of companies in the same three-digit SIC code as the IPO company
with market capitalization within 80–120% of the IPO company market value at the close of the first day of
trading (Lowry and Shu 2002). PEER_RETURNS is the average peer annual buy-and-hold returns in the year
before the IPO date. PEER_SKEWNESS is the average peer skewness of returns during the year before the IPO
date. PEER_TURNOVER is the average peer monthly stock turnover during the year before the IPO date.
PEER_VOLATILITY is the average peer standard deviation of monthly returns during the year before the IPO
date. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 7 Continued
Panel B: Litigation Outcomes and the Use of a Big 4 Auditor
(2)
(1)
SUED_IPO
SUED_IPO
Coef.
Coef.
P-val.
BIG_4
-0.233
0.589
-0.303
GROWTH
0.274
0.349
0.223
LITIGATE
-0.061
0.932
-0.207
SIZE
0.187
0.145
0.247*
PRESTIGE_UW
-0.107
VC
0.494
PEER_TURNOVER
PEER_VOLATILITY
PEER_RETURN
PEER_SKEWNESS
Observations
719
719
AUC
0.743
0.746
Pseudo R2
0.115
0.118
Industry FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES

P-val.
0.485
0.475
0.779
0.079
0.788
0.241

(3)
SUED_IPO
Coef.
0.168
0.125
0.239
0.389**
0.382
0.330
-0.148
9.085*

660
0.757
0.138
YES
YES

P-val.
0.760
0.749
0.802
0.018
0.421
0.460
0.408
0.091

(4)
SUED_IPO
Coef.
0.170
0.119
0.250
0.389**
0.376
0.306
-0.133
8.596
0.015
-0.027
660
0.758
0.138
YES
YES

P-val.
0.760
0.762
0.791
0.017
0.427
0.500
0.472
0.165
0.959
0.971

This table presents logistic regressions of the association between the filing of a class action lawsuit against an IPO company under the Securities Act of 1933
(i.e., IPO lawsuit) and the use of a Big 4 auditor. I use the Audit Analytics Legal database to obtain this data. SUED_IPO is an indicator set to one if the IPO
company was the defendant in an IPO lawsuit. In Columns (1) and (2), the sample size is reduced from my full sample of 788 observations because some 2digit SIC industries have no IPO lawsuits. In Columns (3) and (4), the sample size is further reduced because I was unable to identify peer(s) for the IPO
company given peer requirements. The *,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels using two-tailed p-values and are derived
from test statistics based on robust standard errors. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 7 Continued
Panel C: Frequency of IPO Lawsuits Filed by Auditor Type
Big 4 IPO
Second-Tier IPO
Defendant
Client Sued
Client Sued
IPO Client Only
6.78%
8.40%
(47/693)
(8/95)
IPO Client and Auditor
0.87%
0.00%
(6/695)
(0/95)
7.65%
8.40%
Total IPO Clients
(53/693)
(8/95)

Diff. in
Means
-0.016

P-val.
0.557

0.009***

0.009

-0.008

0.557

This table presents the frequency with which IPO clients and their auditors are sued in relation to an IPO by
auditor type. Lawsuits are securities class action claims brought under the Securities Act of 1933.

Panel D: Descriptive Statistics for IPO Lawsuit Outcomes by Auditor Type
Big 4 IPO Clients
Second-Tier IPO Clients
Clients
693
95
Outcomes of Lawsuit Filings
IPO Lawsuits
Percent Settled
Percent Dismissed
Percent Ongoing
Percent For Defendant
Percent Other

47
51.06 %
25.54 %
10.60 %
0.00 %
12.80 %

8
50.00 %
37.50 %
0.00 %
12.5 %
0.00 %

Settlement Information
Settlement Amount
Assets (Pre-IPO Year)
Settlement / Assets
Revenues (Pre-IPO Year)
Settlement / Revenues
IPO Proceeds
Settlement / Proceeds

7.04
151.32
4.65 %
165.50
4.25 %
129.40
5.44 %

4.69
288.43
1.60 %
247.03
1.90 %
100.33
4.67 %

This table presents descriptive statistics on litigation outcomes and settlement amounts for securities class action
claims against IPO companies in my sample brought under the Securities Act of 1933 by auditor type. I use the
Audit Analytics Legal database to obtain this data. Averages (in millions) are presented for the settlement,
revenues, and proceeds of the sued IPO company. Settlement amounts for Big 4 IPO client amounts exclude the
settlement of Snap Inc.’s because it is an outlier. Snap Inc settled a class action alleging the company and its
executives used faulty growth metrics ahead of its 2017 IPO for $155 million. The settlement amount is over 20
times larger than the average of other Big 4 settlement amounts. The company’s auditor (EY) was not named in
the lawsuit.
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TABLE 8
IPO Audit Fees and the Use of a Big 4 Auditor
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics for Audit Fees in the Pre-IPO Year and IPO Year by Auditor Type (N=788)
Big 4 (N=693)
Second-Tier (N=95)
Diff. in Means
Variable
Mean
P25
P50
P75
Mean
P25
P50
P75
Diff.
P-val.
Pre-IPO Year
AUD_FEES
781.91
227.00
572.50 1,100.00
474.65 145.00 267.74
586.14
307.26*** 0.001
IPO Year
AUD_FEES

1,291.05

Pre-IPO and IPO Year
AUD_FEES
2,072.96

709.10

1,106.24 1,671.09

666.04

277.78

551.99

926.06

642.60***

0.000

1,170.02

1,824.38 2,588.00

1,140.67

460.15

906.16

1,431.91

932.27***

0.000

This table presents descriptive statistics for audit fees charged to IPO clients in my sample. AUD_FEES is audit fees (in thousands) and reflects amounts
disclosed in the DEF 14A proxy statement filed after the company becomes public. I obtain audit fee data primarily from Audit Analytics, hand collecting
from DEF 14A filings where data is missing. Big 4 auditors include Deloitte, EY, KPMG, and PwC. Second-Tier auditors are non-Big 4 auditors that are
annually inspected by the PCAOB in the year of the IPO and include BDO, Grant Thornton, Marcum (since 2014), and RSM (McGladrey before 2015). The
*,**,*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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TABLE 8 Continued
Panel B: The Association between Audit Fees and the use of a Big 4 Auditor
(1)
(2)
Year
Pre-IPO Year
IPO Year
AUD_FEES
AUD_FEES
Variables
Coef.
P-val.
Coef.
BIG_4
0.373***
0.002
0.506***
AGE
0.064
0.387
-0.039
AUD_CHANGE
-0.178
0.280
EGC
-0.346**
0.038
0.186
FOREIGN
0.329***
0.004
0.088*
GROWTH
0.219**
0.016
0.092**
LEVERAGE
0.246**
0.018
0.186
LITIGIOUS
0.063
0.705
-0.059
LOSS
0.166
0.240
0.235***
PCT_RETAINED
-0.509*
0.094
0.161
PRESTIGOUS_UW
-0.035
0.730
0.092
PROCEEDS
-0.014
0.862
0.006
ROA
-0.162**
0.015
0.105
SEGMENTS
0.242*
0.060
0.070
SIZE
0.353***
0.000
0.305***
TECH
-0.223*
0.084
0.003
VC
-0.009
0.940
0.072
Observations
788
788
Adj. R2
0.338
0.515
Industry FE
YES
YES
Year FE
YES
YES

P-val.
0.000
0.334
0.102
0.089
0.024
0.206
0.591
0.000
0.119
0.107
0.924
0.134
0.128
0.000
0.968
0.213

(3)
Pre-IPO and IPO Year
AUD_FEES
Coef.
P-val.
0.489***
0.000
-0.035
0.412
-0.020
0.834
0.036
0.749
0.112**
0.022
0.063
0.303
0.090
0.128
-0.017
0.871
0.147***
0.009
-0.016
0.930
0.054
0.302
0.028
0.586
-0.020
0.136
0.232**
0.015
0.273***
0.000
-0.084
0.198
0.078
0.158
788
0.548
YES
YES

This table presents linear regressions of the association between audit fees and the use of a Big 4 auditor. AUD_FEES is audit fees and reflects fee amounts
disclosed in the DEF 14A filed after the company goes public. In Column (1), AUD_FEES includes pre-IPO year audit fees and control variables are as of the
pre-IPO year. In Column (2), AUD_FEES includes IPO year audit fees and control variables are as of the IPO year. In Column (3), AUD_FEES includes the
sum of pre-IPO year and IPO year audit fees and control variables that vary year-over-year are averaged across the pre- and IPO- year. The *,**,*** indicate
statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01 levels. All variables are defined in Appendix A.
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